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Peter Diamond 
Individual account proposals come with a vast variety of different struc- 
tures and details. There are many different ways in which a discussion of 
individual accounts might be organized. For analytic discussion of admin- 
istrative charges, a central distinction is between government-organized ac- 
counts and privately  organized accounts.  The term government-organized 
accounts will be used to denote individual account systems in which the 
government arranges for both the record keeping for the accounts and 
the investment management for the funds in the accounts-whether  these 
functions are performed by government agencies or by private firms under 
contract to the  government. An example of  government-organized ac- 
counts is the federal Thrift Savings Plan (TSP), a pension plan that con- 
tracts with a government agency to perform record keeping and with a 
private firm to do fund management. The term privately  organized ac- 
counts will be used to denote individual account systems in which individ- 
uals directly select private firms to do the record keeping and investment 
management. An example is IRAs, where individuals select their own pri- 
vate financial institution. 
With government-organized accounts, two questions are how much it 
costs to run  the system and how  the government allocates those costs 
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among the different accounts (and possibly to outside sources of revenue). 
There are also costs that may fall on employers and workers. With pri- 
vately organized accounts, we must ask about equilibrium prices and their 
relation to selling costs as well as the costs of record keeping and invest- 
ment management. Again, there are also costs that may fall on employers, 
workers, and the government. Since the government may be purchasing 
services from private providers, another way to see this distinction is that 
government-organized accounts are organized on a group basis while pri- 
vately organized accounts are organized on an individual basis. As with 
financial and insurance products generally, the group and individual mar- 
kets function very differently and yield different pricing structures.’ 
A central element in thinking  about costs is  the  quality  of  services 
offered with the accounts. With government-organized accounts, the cen- 
tral question for this element is what Congress might legislate and, under- 
lying that, what services are likely to be requested by  constituents. With 
privately organized accounts, Congress will legislate a minimum standard 
of quality of services, but the market is likely to offer an array of services, 
extending above the minimum. In turn, this equilibrium is likely to be in- 
fluenced by the details of the regulations that are placed on these accounts 
for these accounts are likely to be subject to a new  set of regulations, 
possibly administered by  a new regulatory body or possibly handled by 
one or more existing bodies, such as the SEC. These regulations will affect 
the  costs of  providing services and may  include regulation directly of 
charges, either in level or in form. 
There are many steps in organizing and running individual accounts. 
The costs of different steps might be paid by  different sources: workers, 
employers, charges against the accounts, the rest of social security, the 
non-social  security portion of the federal budget. In comparing different 
cost estimates, it is important to be clear about which tasks, and their 
costs, are included in a given estimate and which are assumed to be borne 
elsewhere. To help with such comparisons, the National Academy of So- 
cial Insurance (NASI) Panel on Privatization of Social Security prepared 
a list of many of the tasks associated with having accounts. That list is re- 
produced here as appendix A. 
The  paper  proceeds  by  first  describing how  a  low-cost/low-services 
government-organized plan might look, how it differs from the TSP, and 
what it might cost. For this purpose, I rely heavily on NASI (1998). My 
estimate of the cost of such a system is in the range of roughly $40-$50 
per worker per year. I suspect that there would be pressure for more ser- 
vices, which would raise costs. After this discussion, the paper turns to 
1. The paper does not consider the use of employers to organize groups for some workers, 
as would follow with a mandate on employers rather than on workers. The Australian system 
is a mandate on employers (see, e.g.,  Edey and Simon 1998). Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges  139 
privately organized accounts and the nature of equilibrium. My conclu- 
sion is that, for the small accounts that are the current focus of political 
discussion (financed from 2-3  percent of payroll), the costs of private or- 
ganization would be very high compared to the cost of government organi- 
zation, given the perceived advantages of such a system. 
4.1  Government-Organized Accounts 
The creation of mandatory government-organized individual accounts 
would  involve setting up nearly  150 million individual accounts, with a 
system to produce a flow of deposits into the accounts and a mechanism 
for investing, reporting, and changing portfolio choices.2  To put the scope 
of a possible new system in perspective, the TSP maintains fewer than 
3 million individual accounts, the largest number of existing individual 
accounts handled by a single firm has under 6 million accounts, and there 
are fewer than 10 million IRAs with multiple investment options. No ex- 
isting system could handle the administrative complexities of a program 
with this scope of individual accounts; creating one would take time and 
resources. 
In addition to needing a structure for accumulation in individual ac- 
counts, a structure is needed for the provision of retirement-income flows. 
This issue is considered below after the structure and cost of the accumula- 
tion phase are considered. 
Since the present structure of social security would be preserved for the 
remaining defined-benefit retirement system as well as disability insurance 
and survivors insurance for young families, any introduction of individual 
accounts would add to the costs of social security. Currently, social secu- 
rity costs about $16 per person (workers and beneficiaries) per year. Ex- 
cluding the costs of the disability program, OASI costs about $10 per per- 
son per year. A cost of $10 per participant is a cost of $14.50 per wo~ker.~ 
4.1.1  Measuring Costs 
Setting up and administering a system of individual accounts involves 
a variety of types of costs. Some would be one-time costs to set up the 
system, independent of the size of the system. Other setup costs would de- 
pend on the number of participants. In terms of ongoing costs, most are 
2. One can have a defined-contribution system without any individual portfolio choice. 
While such a construct is useful for analytic purposes (see, e.g., Diamond 1998), this is not 
on the agenda of proposals being taken seriously currently. 
Much of the presentation in this section is drawn verbatim from NASI (1998). 
3. The estimates for costs are based on the 1997 administrative cost of $3.4 billion for the 
total program divided by  198.7 million participants (145 million workers and 43.7 million 
beneficiaries). The cost for only the retirement and survivors part of social security is based 
on an administrative cost of $2.1 billion and 182.6 million participants (145 million workers 
and 37.6 million beneficiaries) (Board of Trustees 1998, 97, 105; SSA 1997, 167, 183). 140  Peter Diamond 
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fixed costs per account, while some depend on the size of the account. 
Since the bulk of ongoing costs would likely be fixed costs per account, 
estimating costs is approached in those terms (e.g., x  dollars per account 
per year). That is, the cost of managing the aggregate portfolio is small 
relative to the costs of record keeping, including communication with ac- 
count owners. With  the TSP, investment-management fees are roughly 
one-tenth of total costs borne by the TSP (with the costs borne by federal 
agencies also fixed costs per account). Dividing an annual dollar cost by 
annual deposits converts this to a percentage front load. 
It is  also  useful  to  express these costs in  other  ways.  One familiar 
method  of stating costs is  as an annual management fee in percentage 
terms (e.g., y percent of the accumulated balance in the account per year). 
Once the size of the accounts has been estimated, a dollar cost per year 
and a percentage of balances per year can be related by calculations that 
equate the present discounted value of costs over the career of a worker. 
If charges are imposed to cover the costs under these two methods, the 
charges will be equal on a lifetime basis but will likely differ in any given 
year or stage of life. With balances that grow relative to wages, a constant 
percentage  of balances is  a smaller charge in early years and a larger 
charge in later years. A third way  in which to report  on the costs is  in 
terms of  the percentage decrease in the accumulation in an account at 
retirement age as a consequence of the administrative charges, called the 
charge ratio. The relation among percentage front load, annual manage- 
ment fee, and charge ratio, based on continuous-time calculations, are pre- 
sented in appendix B, which is reproduced from Diamond (1998). Some 
examples are shown in table 4.1. 
The costs of organizing the accounts depend on the level  of  services 
provided with the accounts. Examples of variation in the level of services 
include variations in the frequency of deposits of withheld funds into the 
accounts, the number of alternative investment options available, the fre- 
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Table 4.1  Decline in Value of Accounts due to Fees after a 40-Year Work Career 
Front-load fees 
(% of new 
contributions) of: 
1 Yn  1 
1 OY"  10 
20Yn  20 
'  Annual management 
fees (% of account 
balance) of: 
0.1%  2.2 
0.5%  10.5 
1  .O%  19.6 
Note: I assume real wage growth of 2.1 percent and a real annual return on investments of 
4 percent. With a larger difference between the rate of return and the wage growth rate, the 
charge ratio with annual management fees is slightly larger, and conversely. Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges  141 
quency of interfund transfers that is allowed, the frequency of  reporting 
on balances, the availability of information (e.g., an 800 number), the ease 
of communication (e.g., the presence of people who can speak different 
languages), and the amount of education made available to workers. 
I begin by  considering government-organized accounts that have rela- 
tively low costs and provide a relatively low level of services. The following 
description is taken from NASI (1998), with a few modifications. In partic- 
ular, using round numbers and reflecting diverse opinions, the panel de- 
scribed a range of costs as being $25-$50.  I use a range of $40-$50  because 
I consider this range more plausibly centered. 
4.1.2  An Illustrative Low-Cost/Low-Services Plan 
Transmission of Funds 
At present, employers pay social security taxes to the Treasury shortly 
after each pay period, with a frequency depending on the size of the em- 
ployer.  However, these payments are not  individually identified  to the 
Treasury; that is, the Treasury knows the employer but not the individual 
employee associated with any tax payment. Once a year, employers file W-2 
forms that show the annual taxable earnings of individual workers, which 
are needed for the eventual determination  of benefits. Until  1978, firms 
reported on individual earnings quarterly, but that frequency was reduced 
to hold down costs, particularly for employers with few worker~.~  At pres- 
ent, of the 6.5 million employers that report to the Social Security Admin- 
istration (SSA) each year, 5.4 million file their W-2 reports on paper; these 
include more than 4 million employers with ten or fewer employees. 
While shifting to more frequent reporting might not be costly for em- 
ployers with electronic record keeping, doing so would represent a signif- 
icant  cost for  small  businesses. Therefore, in  the low-cost/low-services 
version of individual accounts, it is assumed that these taxpaying and re- 
porting practices of private firms would not change. With this structure, 
the Treasury could place the portion of aggregate payroll-tax revenues that 
was  allocated  for  individual accounts  in  a  separate  trust  fund, which 
would earn interest. Such a fund could hold Treasury debt, but it might 
be better to hold the estimated average portfolio, based on existing alloca- 
tions and previous earnings. This would permit an allocation to individual 
accounts  that  reflected individual portfolio  choices (which would  have 
been made before the year began). Moreover, the allocation to individual 
accounts might go more smoothly in the capital market if assets were allo- 
cated to the accounts rather than funds to buy assets. Without a direct 
4. Olsen and Salisbury (1998, 15) cite a 1972 estimate of the cost savings to small employ- 
ers from dropping quarterly reporting that, “adjusted to 1997 dollars, , . . would amount to 
about $900 million a year.” 142  Peter Diamond 
adjustment, there would be some difference between the total investment 
returns of the separate trust fund and the amounts to be credited to indi- 
vidual accounts. This difference could be averaged over time, or alloca- 
tions could be adjusted each year, but something would need to be done. 
However, the allocation could not recognize the actual timing of payments 
by different workers; all workers would be treated as if the timing of their 
withheld tax payments were the same as the timing of  aggregate with- 
holdings. 
Once a year, the Treasury would allocate the accumulated separate trust 
fund to individual accounts. To process almost all the accounts without 
greater cost than at present would probably require seven to nine months 
after the end of the year in which the taxes had been colle~ted.~  More time 
would be required for those cases in which there was a mismatch between 
the reported W-2 information and social security records as well as for the 
self-employed, who can file as late as 15 April (and later if they file for an 
extension). In a system this large, even a small percentage of errors adds 
up to a large number of errors. Currently, roughly 3 percent of W-2 forms 
(6 million cases) require direct contact with employer or employee to 
match the W-2 and social security records. With the additional element of 
portfolio allocation, more errors would have to be resolved. 
Portfolio Choice 
Under this structure, individuals would inform social security about the 
division of their deposits among the available portfolios. Workers might 
do this directly or through their employers, but, in either case, it would 
have to be done before the start of the calendar year, with the allocation 
unchanged from the previous year unless the worker requested otherwise. 
Presumably, a chosen allocation would be unchanged until a worker se- 
lected a different one. Thus, a worker changing employers would not need 
to report a portfolio choice to social security; only newly covered workers 
and workers wanting to change their allocations would need to report. 
Since many new and changed allocations would be reported on paper if 
done by a firm or on paper or by phone if done by workers, there are likely 
to be errors and a need for both an error-correction mechanism and a 
record-keeping function to provide evidence for sorting out errors6  Some 
individuals, particularly newly  covered workers, would not have selected 
an allocation, and there would have to be  a default portfolio for these 
workers. This could be legislated to be  similar to the current portfolio 
of the Social Security Trust Fund, or the average portfolio in individual 
5. Mitchell  (1998, 417) reports, “Only 70  percent of  earnings were  posted  within  six 
months of the tax-year end in  1991.” 
6. As an example of the difficulties present in error correction, Olsen and Salisbury (1998, 
25)  cite unpublished SSA data (1998) that “approximately 10 percent of employers reporting 
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accounts, or a prudently selected portfolio. In addition to directing the 
flow of new deposits among different index funds, workers would be al- 
lowed to shift existing account balances on a limited basis, such as once a 
year. Again, if  this were allowed, a record-keeping mechanism would be 
needed to deal with possible mistakes or claims of  mistakes. Similarly, 
information on the level of their accounts would be provided directly to 
workers only once a year, Workers could infer the value of their accounts 
by  knowing the number of units held in each account and checking the 
values of  those units, which would likely  be presented regularly in the 
media. 
To keep costs low, worker education about portfolio choices would be 
limited to providing pamphlets on investment strategy. It should be noted, 
however, that experience with worker education in 401(k) plans shows that 
considerably more substantial (and expensive) worker education is needed 
to have a noticeable effect on workers’ investment choices (Bayer, Bern- 
heim, and Scholz 1996). Moreover, the covered population includes many 
people who have not considered investment choices, making this low level 
of  education an important issue. As reported  by  Arthur Levitt (1998), 
SEC research indicates that half the public do not know the difference 
between a stock and a bond. In addition to this minimal outreach provid- 
ing education, the SSA would need to respond to questions asked by cov- 
ered workers. Presumably, this would be a major source of cost, partic- 
ularly  reflecting the education and language difficulties of  part  of  the 
population. 
Handling and managing the aggregate funds would probably require 
only a small management fee. Currently, the TSP is charged roughly one 
basis point by the fund managers handling the bond and stock funds. 
Bene$ts 
The cost of paying retirement benefits from individual accounts must 
also be considered. Assuming that annuitization is  mandated, the least- 
cost approach would be automatic annuitization of these funds according 
to rules set by  legislation, with the payments added to the payment of 
whatever defined benefits were maintained.  Information  would  be pro- 
vided to beneficiaries on the source of each payment. 
4.1.3  Cost 
A starting place for estimating the additional costs to social security for 
adding such a low-cost/low-services individual account plan is the portion 
of the costs of the TSP that fall on the TSP (i.e., excluding the costs that 
fall on federal agencies that educate workers, answer questions, and report 
earnings records to the TSP and excluding the administrative costs coming 
from the payment of annuities [which are paid by  retirees and reflected 
in the price of privately supplied annuities]). The TSP cost is  currently 144  Peter Diamond 
roughly $20 per worker per year, although the costs were lower when fewer 
services were  pr~vided.~  With  140 million accounts, a cost of  $20 per 
worker would be an aggregate cost of $2.8 billion per year. The start-up 
costs of the TSP in 1987 were $5.25 million; if the start-up costs were the 
same per participant, the  1998 cost would be $1.08 billion (Olsen and 
Salisbury 1998). 
There are a number of issues involved in comparing TSP costs with the 
incremental costs of the low-cost/low-services system just described. On 
the one hand, the TSP provides better services (in terms of frequency of 
reporting, frequency of portfolio change, and frequency of deposit), must 
deal with loans against workers’ accounts, and has fewer economies of 
scale. In addition, social security would have some economies of scope. 
For example, a single annual statement can contain information on both 
parts of the system. These factors tend to lower the costs of social security 
individual accounts relative to TSP costs. On the other hand, there are 
factors that tend to raise the cost of  social security individual accounts 
relative to TSP costs. First, many costs of the TSP system are borne by 
federal agencies as employers. They handle the education of participants 
(providing more education than described in the low-cost plan), respond 
to their questions, enroll them in the plan, transmit their portfolio choices 
electronically, and make employees whole when  reporting  errors cause 
them to lose investment returns on their contributions. If employers do 
not fill the roles that they fill with the TSP, these costs will likely fall on 
social security. Many of the 140 million workers have more limited educa- 
tion and less proficiency in  English than is typical of federal employees, 
and direct contact would be needed to handle the tasks outlined above. 
For example, the cost of providing account information over the Internet 
is  1 percent of the cost of providing the information by  an operator re- 
sponding to an 800 number and 4 percent of the cost of providing it by 
an automated 800 number (Joel Dickson, personal communication, 1998). 
The social security population  would make less use of the Internet, on 
average, than the 401(k) population. Second, social security covers many 
small employers that report social security records on paper rather than 
electronically, which would add to the cost and risk of errors in record 
keeping. While error correction for earnings needs to be done for the con- 
tinuing defined-benefit system, adjusting individual accounts for the same 
errors would be an additional cost. Also, correction of errors in reported 
portfolio choice would have additional costs. Third, social security covers 
part-time, intermittent, and highly mobile workers, many of whom have 
multiple employers, whereas federal employees have low  labor mobility. 
7. The estimate for the TSP is based on its 1997 balance sheet and includes administrative 
costs of $44.1 million, investment-management fees of $2.3 million, and fiduciary insurance 
of $0.2 million, divided by 2.3 million participants (Arthur Anderson  1998). Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges  145 
Table 4.2  Percentage of Workers with Social Security Earnings below Specified 
Levels (wage and salary workers, 1996) 
Annual Taxable Earnings  No. of  Yo  of 


































Source: Ofice of the Actuary, SSA 
Fourth, there are likely to be mandatory adjustments on divorce and ac- 
count sharing between spouses. Finally, there will be costs of providing 
benefits, whether annuitized or paid out regularly, that are not part of TSP 
costs. A range of $40-$50  per worker per year seems to me a reasonable 
rough order of magnitude for a low-cost/low-services plan. A bit lower or 
somewhat higher cannot be ruled out. I note that this is a considerably 
higher cost than the 10.5 basis points for accounts financed by  1.6 percent 
of payroll assumed by the Advisory Council on Social Security (1997). 
While the bulk of the costs would be fixed per account, their effect on 
the accumulation in individual accounts would depend on how charges 
for  these  costs  were  allocated  across  accounts  of  different  sizes.  The 
charges could be proportional  to deposits or to account sizes, implying 
that all workers with the same portfolio choice would receive the same 
rate of return. Alternatively, the charges could include a fixed component 
reflecting the underlying structure of the costs, implying that workers with 
higher accumulations would have better rates of return net of charges. The 
importance of this choice depends on the dispersion in earnings for the 
covered population. In 1996,22 percent of workers covered by social secu- 
rity earned less than $5,000, while 58 percent earned below $20,000 (table 
4.2).  Presumably, government-organized  accounts would follow the ap- 
proach of uniform percentage charges. 
How would these added costs affect the retirement income of covered 
workers? The relative significance of a cost range of $40-$50  per worker 
per year would depend on the proportion of workers’ earnings being de- 
posited in the accounts and the size of their earnings. In 1997, mean social 
security  taxable  earnings were  approximately  $23,000. If  2 percent  of 
workers’ earnings went to individual accounts, the mean deposit would be 146  Peter Diamond 
$460. A $40-$50  cost charged to the account would be equal to 9-1  1 per- 
cent of the new contribution (equivalent to a “front-load’’ charge) for the 
mean earner. Presumably, the cost would rise roughly in step with average 
wages, keeping the front load roughly constant in percentage terms. These 
calculations would be the same for workers at any earnings level if charges 
were the same percentage for all workers. If charges reflected some of the 
fixed costs of accounts,  the load would  be  larger for low  earners and 
smaller for high earners. The calculation for accounts financed from larger 
or smaller percentages of payroll would be proportional. 
Another way to describe these charges is to ask what charge as a frac- 
tion of assets under management would cover these costs on a lifetime ba- 
sis, assuming that the cost grew with average wages. Using table 4.1 above, 
with 2 percent  accounts an annual $40-$50  change would  be  roughly 
equivalent to a forty- to fifty-basis-point charge on assets under manage- 
ment over a forty-year career. 
Note that the distribution of earnings of workers covered by social secu- 
rity is very different from that of earnings of current 401(k) participants. 
In contrast to table 4.2, of workers participating in 401(k) plans in  1993, 
only about 20 percent earned less than $20,000 (EBRI 1994). 
4.1.4  Level of Services 
Costs would be raised by  the provision of  additional services, such as 
more frequent  reporting  on accounts, more  frequent  deposits into ac- 
counts, more frequently allowed reallocations of existing portfolios, more 
readily available information on account balance, more resources devoted 
to answering questions, or more worker education. Thus, a critical ques- 
tion is what level of services would be a political equilibrium. A low-cost/ 
low-services plan would provide far fewer services than a typical 401(k) 
account, with which much of the public is familiar. That might be one 
source of pressure for more services. In addition, unless voters make a 
good connection between services and costs, there might be pressure for 
more services that Congress might be inclined to satisfy since it does not 
have to legislate a tax increase to finance the higher services, the higher 
cost just coming out of the individual accounts without explicit pricing by 
Congress. Thus, a steady rise in services and costs might well be the politi- 
cal equilibrium, as it has been with the TSF? 
4.1.5  Payment of Benefits 
The cost of  paying retirement benefits from individual accounts also 
depends  on legislative decisions. Assuming that  annuitization  is  man- 
dated, the least-cost approach would be automatic annuitization of these 
funds according to rules set by legislation, with the payments added to the 
payment of whatever defined benefits were maintained. Information would 
be provided to beneficiaries on the source of each payment. Such a system Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges  147 
would add little to the total costs of social security. However, this method 
for providing services might not be the political equilibrium. An impor- 
tant issue with mandated annuitization of accounts that are individually 
owned and managed is  the political stability of such a proposal  as the 
public’s view of social security shifts. For example, would an individual 
with limited life expectancy or extraordinary immediate needs be forced to 
annuitize? Indeed, proposals for individual accounts sometimes propose 
alternatives, including some degree of  choice as to how benefits are re- 
ceived. Another reason why  this might not be the political equilibrium is 
that it would involve social security’s directly holding the assets that back 
the annuity promise. Some of the reasons that some people favor individ- 
ual accounts have them favoring private market provision of annuities, 
unless the backing is fully in indexed Treasury debt. First, I consider pri- 
vate market-provided  annuities for government-organized accounts with 
mandated annuitization. Then I consider possible alternatives for benefit 
provision. 
Annuity Provision 
Annuitization of  individual accounts might be accomplished in three 
different ways. First, the federal government could decide what benefits to 
pay for given accumulations, with social security bearing the risk inherent 
in projecting mortality and selecting a portfolio. Second, the federal gov- 
ernment could contract with private providers to receive accounts from 
the government in return for paying the annuities. These annuities would 
be priced on a group basis. These payments could go directly to beneficia- 
ries or to the government for transmittal to beneficiaries; in the latter case, 
the government would provide the payments directly to beneficiaries along 
with defined benefits. The private providers would bear the mortality and 
return risks, although there would be residual risk that a private insurance 
company would be unable to meet its obligations for annuity payments. It 
would be undesirable and probably politically untenable to put that resid- 
ual risk on individuals, particularly those late in life. Therefore, the gov- 
ernment should absorb that residual risk. Currently, insurance companies 
receive oversight from state  governments, not the  federal government; 
with such a residual risk for the federal government, there would be a call 
for federal oversight instead of or in addition to state oversight. Third, 
individuals could be  left free to contract with  insurance companies on 
their own, purchasing annuities from their accounts. This approach would 
employ individual rather than group purchase of annuities. In insurance 
markets generally, group products  are considerably less expensive than 
individual products. This outcome reflects both lower costs for insurance 
companies in dealing with groups and greater competition for large group 
accounts than for smaller individual accounts. Costs with the third  ap- 
proach would be considerably higher than with either of the other two. 148  Peter Diamond 
The costs of private market annuitization are discussed elsewhere (see Po- 
terba and Warshawsky, chap. 5 in this volume; and also Mitchell et al. 
1999). 
Like many insurance products, annuities are offered far more cheaply 
on a group basis than on an individual basis. In order to have private 
provision on a group basis with a large national program, some mecha- 
nism would be needed. One issue is the sheer size of the program, calling 
for the use of multiple groups and multiple providers rather than a single 
provider of  annuities for all retirees. If  multiple groups are used, then, 
to preserve as much of the advantage of group purchase as possible, the 
government needs to allocate people to different groups rather than al- 
lowing the market to form the groups (Diamond 1992). Since there is little 
reason for a geographic concentration of benefit recipients, people could 
be allocated to different groups randomly, giving everyone roughly the 
same opportunities,  which could be adjusted by  cross-subsidization be- 
tween groups receiving slightly different bids. While such group provision 
is likely to be somewhat more expensive than government provision pro- 
vided the same portfolio were held for backing for the annuity promises, 
there is probably not a great deal of difference in cost. What is likely to be 
more of an issue is the determination of benefits. With private provision, 
the political outcome is more likely to be to accept the prices offered by 
the market. With government provision, there may be pressures for inter- 
vention when the pricing implied by mortality projection and current in- 
terest rates involves a drop in benefits. 
Benefit Alternatives 
Proposals  take  three  different forms with regard  to allowing choice 
about retirement income. Some proposals allow lump-sum withdrawals, 
leaving the worker free to choose the extent of annuitization of that por- 
tion, whatever rules apply to the remaining balances. While providing a 
lump sum is not expensive to social security, retirees who do want to annu- 
itize are then left with the private annuities market in which to annuitize. 
Private market annuitization on an individual basis is considerably more 
expensive than is provision of retirement benefits by social security, mak- 
ing this option costly for those who might annuitize. Those who did not 
annuitize would be bearing the risk of outliving their retirement wealth. 
An intermediate position is to give workers a choice between annuitization 
and periodic withdrawal (e.g., monthly), with a limit on the size of  the 
allowed withdrawal to limit the risk of outliving the retirement wealth. 
Other proposals mandate  annuitization  of the entire accumulation. An 
important issue with mandated annuitization of accounts that are individ- 
ually owned and managed is the political stability of such a proposal as 
the public’s view of social security shifts. For example, would an individual 
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to annuitize? Moreover, with mandated annuitization, the issue remains 
of the extent to which any mandate is for inflation-adjusted annuities and/ 
or for joint-and-survivor annuities for married couples. 
4.1.6  Conclusion 
While individual accounts and annuitized benefits could be provided at 
a cost of around $40-$50  per year, a critical question is what the political 
equilibria would be for the level of services during accumulation and for 
the structure of benefit provision after retirement. Cost estimates need to 
recognize the uncertainty in what will be legislated for the accounts. 
4.2  Privately Organized Accounts 
To consider the charges for government-organized accounts, I followed 
three steps. First, I described the level of services likely to be provided if 
there are government-organized  accounts. Second,  I estimated costs for 
that plan, noting that additional services increase costs. And, third, I sug- 
gested that the costs would be allocated to different workers in proportion 
to either deposits or account balances, or some combination of both. To 
consider privately organized accounts, I discuss the level of services that 
might be provided and how the costs differ from those of government- 
organized accounts. In addition, we  must consider the issues raised by 
competition among private firms. In doing this, I keep in mind a realistic 
picture of competitive markets, not an idealized one. Charges differ from 
the costs identified because of marketing costs and markups (which inter- 
act in equilibrium). 
4.2.1  Deposit of Funds 
There are three methods of deposit of funds to consider. In parallel to 
the low-costtlow-services government-organized plan described above, I 
consider a system under which the government continues to collect all 
taxes and transmits them once a year to private financial firms, with work- 
ers directly informing the government as to which private firm to use. Sec- 
ond, I consider having employers directly transmit the funds to financial 
firms. Third, I consider direct deposit by workers, keying off a tax credit. 
We  need to keep in mind costs that fall on all three players in this sce- 
nario-workers,  employers, and the government. 
If the government transmits the funds once a year to firms, then there 
are some additional costs for the government beyond having it transmit 
the funds to itself. The actual transmission is not likely to have significant 
costs, but there are additional steps. Workers must inform the government 
as to the destination of the funds. There is a major design issue at this 
stage. Is a worker restricted to keeping his or her account at a single fi- 
nancial  institution. or are workers allowed to have accounts at several 150  Peter Diamond 
institutions? If  it is the former (as in Chile), then the government must 
enforce such consistency. When a worker, particularly a worker with a new 
employer, selects a financial institution, the government must check for 
consistency with the location of the existing account. With a centralized 
deposit plan, this is readily accomplished. Without a centralized system, 
restricting workers to a single account is probably not feasible, and we 
would have, as Australia does, a problem of many very small accounts, 
particularly as some low earners might start many accounts. This will be 
a problem for the workers who start multiple accounts in the absence of 
regulatory restrictions and/or subsidies since the earnings on small ac- 
counts would not cover the costs of maintaining  them. If firms are re- 
quired to charge all accounts the same percentage amounts (and to accept 
all workers), this cross-subsidization of  multiple accounts is part of the 
cost for everyone. In Australia, this is  a significant problem and is  one 
reason for preferring the centralized transmission of funds. I assume that 
workers are restricted to a single account each. Otherwise, costs per ac- 
count must be multiplied by  accounts per worker to estimate costs per 
worker. 
With government transmission of funds, the costs include verifying and 
correcting mistakes in the choice of firm, verifying and correcting mistakes 
in the deposits with financial firms (e.g., do the social security number and 
the name in the firm’s records match those given in the incoming deposit 
information?), and overseeing transfers between firms. It seems plausible 
that many workers would shift financial firms from time to time. In Chile, 
turnover  is  roughly 20  percent  per  year. Transmission would  not  cost 
much since all communication between the government and firms would 
be electronic and would be likely to be accurate. The problems would come 
from errors at either end. 
Direct deposits from employers would be significantly more expensive 
for both employers and financial firms. Financial firms would have to pro- 
cess many paper transactions  (duplicating the same paper transactions 
being handled by the SSA) and would have to deal with many employers 
separately. Similarly, employers would  have  higher costs, whatever  the 
frequency of transactions, from dealing with many financial firms as well 
as with the government. In Chile, there are a small number of AFPs (ad- 
ministradoras de fondos de pensiones), so the process is not so bad. In the 
United States, there would be a vast array. While there would arise private 
clearinghouse arrangements (which have not arisen in Chile) to help par- 
ticularly small firms, this is another layer of costs and markups. Moreover, 
there would be the usual tensions in a naturally increasing-returns activity 
between costs and competitive pressures depending on how  many firms 
survived as clearinghouses. Financial firms would still have the problem 
of communicating with both workers and the fund transmitter (employers 
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significantly to costs and has little in the way of benefits that are apparent 
to me in the U.S. context, I will not consider such transmissions further. 
While there would be some economies of scope from combining these ac- 
counts with 401(k)s, it is important to recognize that only a fraction of 
workers have 401(k)s, that regulations covering 401 (k)s are likely to be 
different from those covering mandated accounts (requiring separate re- 
cord keeping), and that it is unlikely that workers would be required to 
use only the options provided by the employer that provides their 401(k)s. 
So, while there is an advantage here, it is unlikely to offset the sizable cost 
disadvantage of this approach. 
Direct deposit by  individual workers has the advantage for financial 
firms that the firms are dealing with only a single entity, although they 
would still need to keep the government informed, as with mutual funds 
currently. The agent with whom they must communicate anyway is the one 
who makes the deposit and whose job it is  to check that the deposit is 
properly handled. With many workers without  financial sophistication, 
the government is likely to play a larger role in policing accuracy than it 
does when dealing with voluntary accounts with financial firms currently. 
This would follow both from the difference in populations from those cur- 
rently dealing with financial firms handling retirement savings and from 
the presence of a mandate. In addition, deposits would be overwhelmingly 
on paper, making for considerably higher costs and error rates than with 
a single electronic transmission from the government. This seems to me 
likely to be  noticeably more expensive than government deposit. More- 
over, it involves issues of some workers filing for refundable tax credits 
who would not otherwise file taxes. So I conduct the analysis on the basis 
of government collection of taxes and transmission to private firms. 
4.2.2  Alternative Investments 
One of the major arguments in favor of privately organized accounts is 
the presence of a wider choice of investment options. In particular, one 
would expect that all three of the banking, insurance, and mutual fund 
industries would be active participants in this market. Banks would offer 
CDs and a vast array of  locations. Insurance companies would offer ac- 
counts with insurance features attached to them. Mutual  funds would 
offer  managed  as well  as indexed funds and  possibly  individually de- 
signed portfolios. 
Several issues arise from this array. One is the currently diverse regula- 
tion of  these different institutions. In particular, mutual funds and banks 
have different federal regulatory agencies, while insurance companies are 
regulated at the state level. Presumably, this would change in a significant 
way under a system of privately organized accounts. 
A second major issue is how to think about the value of  this diversity 
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we normally consider increased options to be advantageous, provided that 
the increased options do not come with adverse price changes as part of 
the adjustment to a new equilibrium. This need not be the case here for 
two reasons, both related to the purpose of and motivation for social secu- 
rity. First, the purpose is to have retirement income. Insofar as workers 
(implicitly) trade off current services (including possibly kickbacks) for a 
lower rate of return (and so lower retirement incomes), the increase in 
options in privately organized accounts is cutting against the primary pur- 
pose of the mandate. Second, insofar as the mandate comes from a con- 
cern that individuals do not do a good job of looking out for themselves 
when  it comes to retirement planning, it seems right  to recognize that 
many people will not do a good job of choosing a financial intermediary 
for retirement savings as well. The current financial market is marked, as 
are almost all retail markets, by a diversity of prices for similar, sometimes 
seemingly identical products. Some people end up with high-cost options. 
Since individual accounts  would involve an ongoing relationship, with 
little at stake in any particular month, workers, particularly low earners, 
would not have much incentive to stay on top of the changing array of 
alternative investments and alternative charges. In the absence of detailed 
regulations limiting pricing alternatives, we might see a dizzying array of 
prices and arrangements in this market. 
In this setting, it is important to move beyond an “average” worker and 
to recognize the allocation of  workers across different options and the 
relations between different worker  characteristics, particularly earnings 
level and options selected. Thus, it would not be an adequate analytic ap- 
proach to consider the availability of some low-cost option as the basis for 
evaluation, with an assumption that everyone choosing some higher-cost 
option is gaining from making that choice. Both positive political econ- 
omy and normative considerations suggest that this would be a tightly regu- 
lated market, with both the benefits and the costs of tight regulation. 
Comparing Costs 
In some settings, private firms have lower cost functions than the gov- 
ernment because they have access to better technologies, are able to gener- 
ate better  incentives for  workers, or can pay  lower wages,  perhaps  by 
avoiding unionization. The potential for these opportunities depends on 
the nature of the task being fulfilled. As Wilson (1989) has argued, some 
bureaucratic tasks have outputs that are easy to measure, so it is easier for 
a government bureaucracy to do a good job. Current social security is 
in this category. The tasks are well defined (collect money, keep records, 
distribute money, provide information). Indeed, the costs of social security 
are very low compared to private firms involved in similar activities. More- 
over, this is not a special U.S. outcome but a common feature of  many 
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vanced countries, see Mitchell [1998].) It seems to me that organizing a 
TSP-type system has similar characteristics from the perspective of ease 
of bureaucratic management. I would not expect private firms to have 
lower cost functions than the federal government. In addition to consider- 
ing the cost functions, there are issues of returns to scale since the govern- 
ment system would be vastly larger than the average private system. While 
some firms may have economies of scope from combining their share of 
social security individual accounts with other fund-management activi- 
ties, social security has economies of scope as well. I conclude by suggest- 
ing that  record-keeping  and investment-management costs are likely to 
be higher with privately organized than with government-organized  ac- 
counts. 
Churges 
If the world were like an idealized competitive market, then all we would 
need to know is costs since, in the absence of regulation, charges would 
equal costs. But observation of other countries that have national (man- 
dated or voluntary) privately organized individual accounts (Chile, Argen- 
tina, the United Kingdom) makes it clear that this model does not apply. 
Similarly, consideration of the voluntary individual capital market in the 
United States shows considerable advertising expenses and charges that 
do not have the structure of costs. 
There are two aspects to thinking about equilibrium in such a market. 
What will be the structure of charges, and what will be the levels of pricing 
parameters in the structure? Currently, the most common bases for charges 
in mutual funds are proportional to the amount in an account or a combi- 
nation of the amount in an account and the amounts being deposited- 
in 1997, load funds accounted for more than half of all new sales of equity 
funds (Rea and Reid 1998). The market has higher charges for people with 
lower accounts, minimum account balances, and some flat charges. It is 
plausible that, without regulations on the structure of charges, mandatory 
accounts would see a similar structure. I am not aware of analyses as to 
why  this structure has evolved. I  suspect that a charge in basis points is 
less psychologically aversive than one in dollars-it  is harder to think 
about how much it is actually costing. Since the advantage of having “bet- 
ter” management of funds increases with the size of the funds, charges 
that vary in this way  may take advantage of the way  in which charges 
will  be viewed  and the extent to which investors will shop and switch. 
Presumably, this is a market with considerable inertia as to switching, even 
though switching costs are very low (except from firms that have back 
loads or to firms that have front loads on transfers). 
Looking across different portfolios,  it does seem to be the case that 
those funds with higher costs have higher charges, but there is considerable 
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fund categories that are tracking the same index. Spreads in prices for the 
same services are widespread phenomena in retail markets and suggestive 
of imperfections in perceiving and acting on alternatives that exist in the 
market. This suggests that, without regulation to the contrary, charges on 
average will be higher (in percentage terms) for accounts that are financed 
with a smaller fraction of taxable payroll. It also suggests that charges on 
average will  be higher (in percentage terms) for lower earners than for 
higher earners. 
This view  of markets as having markups and variation primarily be- 
cause of consumer lethargy is clearly different from a perspective that con- 
sumers are choosing the best option in an array of competitive firms that 
offer different qualities of services at different prices. It is  the case that 
firms offer different services in terms of the nonreturn aspects of services. 
But I find it hard to accept the competitive market model. This would be 
particularly  an issue with mandatory  accounts  where  people may  not 
know how services vary across firms or how  to value such services. In 
particular, it is very difficult to assess whether some portfolio managers 
are better than others even if one understands the concept of a risk-return 
trade-off. Given the difficulty in doing this with sophisticated analysis, 
most workers would have considerably greater difficulty, even though Con- 
sumer Reports would be giving ratings to the small fraction of the public 
that would follow such information. I conclude that equilibrium is likely 
to have substantial markups, together with the selling costs that are en- 
couraged by  such markups. 
This possibility has led some analysts to call for a cap on allowable 
charges for handling privately organized accounts. Our experience with 
price regulation leaves it unclear how well such regulation would work. 
In addition, caps would be somewhat difficult to enforce. Some types of 
accounts (e.g., CDs) do not have separate charges. Currently, charges from 
brokerage fees are treated separately from other charges. And costs are 
different for different types of accounts (bond vs. stock, domestic vs. inter- 
national, index vs. managed). 
Current Examples 
One approach is to consider existing market alternatives and their costs. 
While this might give some idea of average charges, it is more difficult to 
consider the degree of matching of different workers with different institu- 
tions. It also needs to be recognized that the average size of accounts may 
well  be  different from any particular  example and that the population 
whose demand reactions affect pricing would be different. 
A key point is that individuals will be seeking out firms on an individual 
basis. Thus while quotations of  charges made by  financial firms on an 
institutional basis are relevant when considering costs with government- 
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organized accounts. We therefore need to consider the market for individ- 
ual choice or the market that deals with small firms. It is natural to look 
at four pieces of evidence. What has happened in other national systems 
with individual accounts organized individually? What are charges for mu- 
tual funds and other investment vehicles? What are charges with IRAs 
and 401(k)s? It is also important to look at the entire market, not just the 
offerings of one or a few  firms. Since other papers in this volume also 
consider the available information, I will be brief. 
Costs in Chile (which are front-load costs of  roughly 15-20  percent) 
are roughly equivalent to seventy-five to one hundred basis points on ac- 
counts that are 10 percent of taxable wages (which seems to me relevant 
since the labor costs of the financial firms will resemble the average labor 
costs  in  an  economy).  Argentina,  with  smaller  accounts,  has  larger 
charges. Mexico, which has amounts put in the accounts by  the govern- 
ment as well as amounts withheld from workers, has higher charges rela- 
tive to the deposits of workers’ withholding but lower charges relative to 
total  deposits.  The  United  Kingdom  has  considerably higher  charges 
than Chile.8 
Some people have argued that costs are high in  Chile because of  the 
nature of  regulation there. Regulations require uniform pricing for all 
workers, preventing the formation of groups that might bargain for lower 
prices, with an unclear implication for charges to the remaining popula- 
tion. Regulation on the structure of charges (only front loads and only a 
combination of flat and proportional charges) would not prevent competi- 
tive pressures, if they are as in the idealized market, from keeping charges, 
on average, close to costs and so holding down the incentive for sales 
efforts. The high markups over production costs and the high fraction of 
costs devoted to sales suggest that it is inherent in individually organized 
markets for this type of product to have high markups. The similarity of 
costs in Chile to those in markets without such price-structure regulations 
also suggests that the details of the regulation are not the prime reason for 
the level of costs.’ 
A recent Investment Company Institute study of equity mutual funds 
(Rea and Reid 1998) argues that the average dollar invested in individual 
funds in  1997 was charged around  149 basis points, not including any 
brokerage charges that go with many of these products. The calculation 
includes balanced and other hybrid funds. This calculation includes both 
annual maintenance charges and an annualization of front-load charges.’O 
8. For more details, see Diamond (1998). 
9. Australia has a mandate on firms, not workers. Thus, evidence from the large-firm sec- 
tion of that economy does not seem relevant for the typical proposal in the United States. 
10. The study argues for the importance of including front loads since roughly two-thirds 
of  retail investors buy mutual funds through sources offering load funds and load funds 
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The study also reports that this average charge has fallen from 225 basis 
points in 1980. The study does not report the average account size, which 
would help for comparison with individual social security accounts.” 
I do not know what the implicit charges would be with bank CDs. Simi- 
larly, I have not looked into insurance company charges. 
I do not examine IRA and 401(k) charges-for  discussions of the litera- 
ture, see Mitchell (1998) and Olsen and Salisbury (1998). As these authors 
note, some data sources (e.g., form 5500) report only part of the charges 
made by financial firms. We need to recognize that both IRA and volun- 
tary accounts may well have lower costs than mandatory accounts because 
financial firms deal only with the depositor in these cases but would deal 
with both the government and the individual with mandatory accounts. 
On the other hand, 401 (k)s have considerable regulation for tax qualifica- 
tion and have financial firms deal with both employers and employees. 
Thus, the costs for providing services to small firms may well  be higher 
than with mandatory accounts organized with direct government deposits. 
Larger firms have economies of scale and bargaining power in negotiating 
individual deals rather than accepting a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the mar- 
ket-so  their charges and costs are probably not relevant for thinking 
about privately organized accounts. 
I see no reason to think that the nature of equilibrium with privately 
organized individual accounts would be dramatically different from these 
examples. The accounts would be smaller and the population dealing with 
the financial community more diverse and less sophisticated on average. I 
suspect that the costs for the typical worker choosing a mutual fund would 
be at least one hundred basis points with accounts from a large percentage 
of  payroll and larger, possibly considerably larger, if  we  are considering 
accounts financed with only 2 percent of payroll. I note that this is roughly 
consistent with the  1 percent cost for accounts financed by  5 percent of 
payroll assumed by the Advisory Council on Social Security (1997). 
Implications of  Charges 
For example, with one hundred basis points of accumulations per year 
charged over a full career, and assuming that wage  growth exceeds the 
interest rate by  2 percent, the final accumulation in privately organized 
accounts would be reduced by  19.6 percent. Other examples were reported 
percent of equity fund assets at the end of 1997. The study does not seem to deal with the 
complication in annualizing front loads owing to the fact that the interest rate relevant for 
the individual depends on the charging structure. I suspect that this would not be a signifi- 
cant change in the calculation, but it should be examined. 
11. Mitchell (1998) reports on expense ratios without front loads separately for different 
types of mutual funds and does report on average account sizes. For fiscal years ending in 
1994-95, calculations show expense ratios varying from 0.324 for equity index funds to 1.043 
for growth funds and 1.250 for global funds. From average account sizes, these translate into 
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in table 4.1 above. Thus, privately organized accounts are likely to deliver 
accumulations at retirement that are at least  10-15  percent  lower than 
could be delivered by government-organized accounts and quite possibly 
even lower.  In addition, the provision of  annuitization would be more 
difficult and would likely be more expensive. 
4.2.3  Conclusion 
My conclusion is that privately organized individual accounts are very 
expensive for satisfying the basic purpose of social security. Since I think 
that government-organized accounts can be reasonably insulated from po- 
litical interference, that the increased choice that would be present with 
privately organized accounts may be as likely to be harmful to the worker 
as helpful, and that greatly increased regulation is likely with the uncer- 
tainties created by  the introduction of a new regulatory structure, I con- 
sider  privately  organized  accounts  to  be  dominated  by  government- 
organized accounts. 
Appendix A 
Tasks in Implementing Individual Accounts 
This list first considers tasks in implementing government-organized ac- 
counts, and then notes tasks that would be different with privately-orga- 
nized accounts. 
Government-Organized Accounts 
This list assumes that contributions are received throughout the year, 
and are linked to individual taxpayers after the end of the year, when W- 
2s are filed. It also assumes that the government receives the money, ar- 
ranges for investment, recordkeeping and benefit payments. An asterisk 
(*) indicates tasks now  done by  the  Social Security Administration  or 
Treasury, or similar tasks. In some cases, the tasks become more complex 
because of differences in timing or other concerns. 
1. Collect Contributions from Employers 
payday.  * 
ports to detect missing or discrepant payments.* 
a. Receive  and  record  money  from  employers  shortly  after  each 
b.  Reconcile amounts received with quarterly 941 and annual W-2 re- 
c.  Segregate account contributions from other taxes paid by employers. 158  Peter Diamond 
2.  Invest Funds 
a.  Select a private fund manager(s). 
b.  Invest new contributions during the year according to government 
c.  Designate a default investment portfolio for individuals not select- 
d. Report investment returns to the recordkeeper-annual  average for 
policy. 
ing one. 
new contributions, monthly/quarterly for account balance valuations. 
3. Credit Workers’ Accounts with New Contributions 
a.  Find missing or inconsistent reports from employers by reconciling 
annual and quarterly reports and correspond with employers to fix it.* 
b.  Record new contributions to individual accounts. Identify discrepan- 
cies between W-2s and SSN files and correspond with employers or em- 
ployees to fix mistakes. 
c.  Set up new information system of records needed to administer ac- 
counts: workers’ ID, portfolio choice, effective date of choice, interfund 
transfers  and date of  interfund  transfer, death beneficiary designation, 
marital status, spouse ID, and spousal consent code (depending on pol- 
icy), current address. 
4.  Enroll Workers and Get Portfolio Choice 
(and Other New Information) 
Depends  on employer involvement (either mandatory or voluntary). 
Options  include:  (i) ongoing  requirement  that  employers  enroll  new 
employees  and  report  portfolio  choices annually  (on  W-2s  or W-4s); 
(ii) one-time employer responsibility to enroll workers in the plan  and 
send data to the record keeper; (iii) do not involve employers-deal  di- 
rectly with workers through  1040s, correspondence, phone, website or in 
person. 
5. Educate and Communicate with Workers 
a.  “Wholesale” tasks (such as in the TSP) include developing educa- 
tional brochures, videos, training courses for employers to use to enroll 
workers. 
b.  “Retail” tasks (performed by employers in the TSP) include one-on- 
one communication  with  workers-via  Social Security (or IRS?) field 
offices, an 800 number, website. 
6. Pay Death Benefits 
on inheritance rights and rules for determining jurisdictions, if relevant. 
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b.  Set rules of evidence for determining correct death beneficiary and 
c. Resolve competing claims when they occur.* 
maintain record system to support it.* 
7.  Implement Policy on Treatment of Accounts at Divorce 
Possible policies include: (i) let courts decide; (ii) automatically divide 
50150 changes in account balances that occurred during the marriage; and 
(iii) automatically divide contributions each year between spouses. De- 
pending on policy, tasks include: 
a. Set policy for treatment of QDRO (qualified domestic relations order 
from court). 
b.  Maintain historical records that can be used to retroactively combine 
and split two individuals’ change in account balances for a period of years 
or each year, link accounts of husbands and wives and transact a split. 
c. Set up systems for verifying marital status and spouse ID, and poli- 
cies for resolving disputes, discrepancies, and informing each party  of 
transactions made on their accounts. 
8.  Pay Retirement Benefits 
u. Determine policies about nature of withdrawal options. 
b.  With annuities, determine whether government or insurance compa- 
nies will: (i) assume mortality and investment risk; and/or (ii) administer 
the annuities. 
c.  If  insurance  companies, determine policy for  their involvement- 
e.g., standards for participation, competitive bidding for group contract, 
some sort of reinsurance. 
d. Policy on joint-and-survivor  annuities and beneficiary designation 
for non-annuitized funds (or period certain annuities). 
9. Retirement Benefit Counseling (assuming a number of withdrawal 
options are available) 
a.  Explain to retirees what the choices are and what terms mean and 
run scenarios of how different choices would affect the particular retiree 
and spouse. 
b.  Set policies (if  any) on who will  provide the information and who 
will pay for it. 
10.  Early Access (if loans or withdrawals end up being allowed for 
“hardship.”) 
a.  Determine hardship rules and how they will be applied. 
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Privately-Organized Accounts: Additional Tasks 
This list assumes that funds are withheld and paid by employers to the 
government (as they are now) and that employers report annually on W-2s 
the amounts belonging to each worker. The government’s tasks in collect- 
ing  contributions would  be  the  same  as  in  government  organized  ac- 
counts. 
When W-2s are in, the government would send each worker’s funds to 
a  financial  institution  chosen  by  the worker. The  financial  institution 
would be responsible for all further dealing with the account holder. It 
would be responsible for: investing funds, crediting workers accounts with 
new contributions, getting information about the worker’s portfolio choice 
and other data needed to pay benefit to the worker or hisher beneficiaries, 
educate and communicate with workers about investment  choices, pay 
death benefits, implement policy on treatment of divorce, pay retirement 
benefits under applicable rules, and provide retirement benefit counseling. 
It would also be responsible for enforcing whatever policy applies with 
regard to early access. 
New issues and tasks that arise under this model: 
a. Government would maintain a default plan or default institution for 
workers who fail to designate a financial institution. 
b.  Government would set rules on financial institutions eligible to hold 
Social Security accounts.* 
c.  If workers would be required to hold their funds in only one institu- 
tion at a time, government and financial institutions would put systems in 
place to ensure that happened. 
d. Once money is sent to the financial institution, it would be respon- 
sible for receiving portfolio choices from workers, sorting out mistakes 
and making employees whole under whatever rules apply. 
e.  Government policies might  regulate  fee arrangements  of financial 
institutions, terms on which accounts are accepted by  institutions, and 
possibly, marketing practices. 
,fi  Government policies might regulate allowable portfolios. 
g.  Government would monitor institutions’ compliance with whatever 
h. Auditing, trustee, legal and related functions, to the extent not in- 
rules apply to the accumulation and distribution of account funds.* 
cluded above. 
Appendix B 
I  do the calculation in continuous time. Consider a worker who earns w, 
at time s,  assumed to grow exponentially at rate g: Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges  161 
(1)  wT =  w,,ey’. 
The tax rate on these earnings is  t. There is a proportional  front-load 
charge off so that t( 1 -  f)woegy  is deposited at time s. This accumulates 
until retirement age, I: The accumulation occurs at the rate r -  c,  where 
r is the rate of return, and c is the management charge per dollar under 
management. Thus, deposits made at time s have accumulated to t(1 - 
f)w,egAe(r-L)(T-S)  at time I: The total accumulation at time T is the integral 
of this expression from time 0 until time I: Integrating, the accumulation 
depends on  f  and c and (for g + c # r)  is equal to the following: 
(2)  A[f,c]  =  t(1 - f)w,e(’-~’r{e(K+‘-‘)T  - l}/(g +  c - r). 
For g + c = r, the accumulation satisfies 
(3)  A[f,c]  =  t(1 - f)Woe‘r’c’T. 
For r unequal to both g + c and g, the ratio of the accumulation to what 
it would be without any charges satisfies 
(4)  AW,  el  =  A[f,  cI~A[O,Ol 
=  (1 - f)e-<T{(e(C+.-.)T  - l)/(e(g-r)T  - 1  )I 
x C(g - r)/(g  +  c - y)} 
The charge ratio is one minus the accumulation ratio: 
(5)  CR[f,c]  =  1 - AR[f,c] 
Sample calculations are shown in table 4.1 above. 
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Comment  Martin Feldstein 
Peter Diamond has made an important contribution to the general anal- 
ysis and design of social security reform by calling attention to adminis- 
trative costs. His earlier writing (Diamond 1997) and our personal discus- 
sions in the past have also caused me to reconsider the appropriate way 
to finance individual investment-based supplementary social security ac- 
counts and to change my own proposal (Feldstein 1997) to an alternative 
structure with significantly  lower  administrative costs.  I return  to this 
below. 
In the present paper, Diamond emphasizes the distinction between two 
types of individual investment-based accounts: government-organized ac- 
counts, in which the government does the record keeping and investment 
management (as it does for the federal employees’ Thrift Savings Plan 
[TSP]), and privately organized accounts, in which private firms do the re- 
cord keeping and investment management. Diamond’s conclusion is that 
government-organized accounts would cost about $40-$50  per account 
Martin Feldstein is the George F.  Baker Professor of Economics at Harvard University 
and president of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges  163 
per year while privately organized accounts would cost about twice as 
much.  For  an  average-size account,  Diamond  translates  the  $40-$50 
charge into a reduced yield of forty to fifty basis points, implying that the 
individual’s accumulation at retirement would be 10 percent less than it 
would be if  there were no administrative cost. The privately organized 
accounts would therefore, according to Diamond, reduce final accumu- 
lation by  about 20 percent. From these calculations, Diamond concludes 
that government-organized accounts would be desirable (or at least ac- 
ceptable) while privately organized accounts would be “prohibitively ex- 
pensive.” 
I do not agree. In this comment, I make four basic points: First, cen- 
trally administered accounts raise fundamental problems that make them 
politically unacceptable as an alternative to part of the pay-as-you-go so- 
cial security system. Second, even if  we  accept Diamond’s estimate that 
government-organized accounts involve a forty- to fifty-basis-point ad- 
ministrative cost per year, the benefit of  such accounts would outweigh 
the cost. Third, the same is true of individually organized accounts; their 
benefits would outweigh their costs even if  those costs were the one hun- 
dred basis points assumed by  Diamond. Fourth, privately organized ac- 
counts would not cost as much as one hundred basis points and could well 
become less expensive than government-organized accounts. 
Centrally Administered Accounts 
Diamond’s estimate that a government-organized account costs forty to 
fifty basis points is relative to a system of investment-based social security 
with no administrative cost at all. The notion of an investment-based com- 
ponent of social security with no administrative cost can only be approx- 
imated by  putting private securities into the Social Security Trust Fund 
or some other centrally administered single account as proposed in the 
Ball  plan  (Advisory Council  on Social Security 1997) and the  Aaron- 
Reischauer (1 998) plan. 
As a practical matter,  I  believe that such a central account  is  not  a 
politically relevant option. Recall that, even with  a mixed  system that 
combines the current pay-as-you-go taxes with investment-based saving 
equal to 2 percent of payroll, the net accumulation after thirty years would 
then be  equal to about 40 percent  of the GDP in that year. In today’s 
economy, that would be more than $3 trillion of private securities owned 
by  the government. The political process, for good reason, would reject 
giving the government control over such a large pool of assets. Advocates 
like Aaron and Reischauer (1998) go to great lengths to emphasize that the 
funds would be administered by an independent administrative authority. 
Opponents reject claims of  such independence since any authority, as a 
creature of legislation, is ultimately responsive to the Congress andor the 
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There are two broad concerns about the power that such an administra- 
tive authority would exercise. First, a government administrative authority 
would introduce political considerations into portfolio-investment deci- 
sions. The most obvious of these would be political prohibitions on in- 
vesting in companies that make certain products (e.g., cigarette compa- 
nies), companies that have been found to violate certain laws  (antitrust 
rules, environmental rules, etc.), foreign-owned companies, U.S. compa- 
nies whose foreign investments “take jobs away from American workers,” 
etc. A second distortion would be geographic distribution requirements of 
the type that cause the defense budget and other public works to be dis- 
tributed among states and congressional districts in response to political 
considerations rather than economic efficiency. A third problem would be 
distortion to risk decisions because of the politically asymmetrical reac- 
tions to gains and losses that would make investment managers likely to 
be excessively cautious to avoid the criticism that they gambled and lost 
retirees’ money. 
These concerns about the role of the government as an owner of equities 
also apply to corporate bonds. How would the government deal with com- 
panies that are in bankruptcy? Would its decision be the same as that of 
a private investment manager, or would it be concerned about employment 
effects, etc.? 
The second broad concern is that government ownership of corporate 
stocks and bonds, even if  in a nominally independent administrative au- 
thority, would bring with it control over corporations. Ownership conveys 
the right to vote shares. Even if  this power were initially disavowed, it 
might eventually be assumed by  the federal fund manager, just as state 
pension funds do now.  How would the administrative authority vote on 
issues like takeovers, foreign takeovers, or poorly performing managers? 
A promise to be a passive investor that does not interfere in the manage- 
ment of the companies that it owns might change, rationalized by  the ar- 
gument that active management could lead to better investment perfor- 
mance, a decision that many state pension plans have made. 
My  impression from conversations with congressional leaders of both 
parties is that such a central account system is politically unacceptable. 
This view has been expressed publicly by Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni- 
han, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Finance Committee, by Demo- 
cratic senator Bob Kerry, and by  a variety of  Republicans in both the 
Senate and the House. 
I conclude from all of  this that, if  there is to be  an investment-based 
component of social security, it must take the form of individual accounts. 
If so, a forty- to fifty-basis-point administrative cost, relative to a central- 
ized investment with no administrative cost (to use Peter Diamond’s esti- 
mate of the effect of the “low-cost’’ government-organized accounts), is 
inevitable if  there is  to be an investment-based component  to social se- 
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Government-Organized Accounts 
That raises the question of whether such an investment-based strategy 
to replace part of the pure pay-as-you-go system is desirable if  it does 
involve an administrative cost of fifty basis points. The simplest way  to 
think about that question is to rephrase it as, If an investment-based social 
security system causes the nation to increase saving and investment above 
what it would otherwise be, is this desirable if the return on that invest- 
ment must be reduced by fifty basis points? The real pretax return to incre- 
ments to the capital stock is about 8.5 percent (Poterba 1997), implying 
that the real return to the increments caused by an investment-based so- 
cial security program would be 8.0 percent if done through government- 
organized accounts. That is a substantially higher rate of return than the 
return that savers now receive after corporate-profits taxes, property taxes, 
and individual taxes on interest, dividends, and capital gains. This differ- 
ence suggests a prima facie case for the desirability of increased saving 
through social security accounts. 
Another way of judging whether an investment-based system of individ- 
ual accounts with an administrative cost of fifty basis points would be 
desirable is to consider the way in which such a system would affect social 
security taxes and benefits over time. Andrew Samwick and I (Feldstein 
and Samwick 1998) present estimates of the effect of saving 2 percent of 
payroll in such accounts and receiving a return equal to 5.5 percent (the 
postwar average real return on a portfolio of 60 percent stocks and 40 per- 
cent bonds net of a forty-basis-point administrative cost). We show that, 
with new saving equal to 2 percent of payroll until 2030, and using the 
corporate tax receipts on the incremental capital stock that results from 
these individual accounts after that, it is possible to maintain the benefits 
provided  in  current  law  without  raising  the  future  payroll  tax,  thus 
avoiding an increase from the current 12 percent tax rate to a rate that is 
permanently more than 18 percent. My judgment is that that is a very at- 
tractive trade-off between current saving and permanently lower taxes. 
My conclusion, in short, is that, if  using an investment-based system 
requires a fifty-basis-point administrative cost, the investment-based sys- 
tem is very much worth doing. 
Privately Organized Accounts 
Government-organized accounts may not be politically acceptable for 
the same reason that a centrally administered account is not acceptable. 
Although government-organized accounts would provide a defined-contri- 
bution system in which individuals might have some influence on the ex- 
tent of the risk that they take, a government-organized system in which 
the government  is  responsible  for  investment  management  would  still 
leave many decisions in the hands of the government fund managers. As 
with any mutual fund, the government fund managers would be respon- 166  Peter Diamond 
sible for voting proxies, deciding whether to tender stocks in  a takeover 
situation, etc. 
With privately organized accounts, the government would be respon- 
sible for regulating what investments are eligible and for the prudential 
supervising of  investment managers. But  individuals would  retain  the 
choice among eligible private managers, and those managers would  be 
responsible for exercising the rights of shareholders. 
If the choice is between a pure pay-as-you-go system and a system of 
privately organized accounts for which, to use Peter Diamond’s estimate 
for now, the cost is one hundred basis points, should the privately orga- 
nized accounts be regarded as “prohibitively expensive”? I think not. The 
question again can be restated by  asking whether an increased national 
investment is desirable if it earns a real return of 7.5 percent. That is again 
much more than the real after-tax return that individuals can earn in their 
private capacity, suggesting that such a return is a desirable investment. 
Indeed, unless the general consensus that the United States should save 
and invest more is true for a real return of 8.5 percent but would not be 
for a return of 7.5 percent, this is a desirable investment decision for the 
nation. That this return would accrue to the social security system in  a 
way the avoids a permanent increase in the payroll-tax rate of more than 
6 percentage points-from  the current 12.4 percent to more than 18 per- 
cent-is  an extra advantage. 
To be more specific about the nature of individually organized accounts, 
I will now describe what I believe would be a cost-effective way to adminis- 
ter such accounts. A key aspect of the cost is how the money is collected 
and transferred to individual accounts. In my November 1997 Wall Street 
Journal article, I suggested that each individual would establish an account 
similar to an IRA, send 2 percent of his or her wage up to the maximum 
social security taxable earnings to that account, and receive a refundable 
income-tax credit for that amount. The net result would be that the indi- 
vidual added 2 percent  of income to the account  at no personal  cost. 
These tax credits could be financed out of the projected budget surpluses, 
assuring that those surpluses would not be spent on public or private con- 
sumption. 
After publishing that article, I was persuaded by  Peter Diamond and 
others that this method of depositing funds in individual accounts would 
be too expensive because of the large number of individuals with multiple 
jobs, small incomes, etc. I now believe that a better way is to use the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) to transfer 2 percent of wage income from 
the Treasury (i.e., from the budget surplus) to individual fund managers 
selected by the individual employees. The SSA has the information on the 
total earnings of each individual up to the social security taxable maxi- 
mum. Although that information is available only with a lag, individuals 
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Costs could also be limited if each individual could have only one fund 
manager (although  multiple investments with that manager) and could 
change fund managers no more than once a year. Individuals would indi- 
cate the identification number of their chosen fund manager on their tax 
return when they establish the account and whenever they want to change 
fund manager. The SSA would then wire the money and the names and 
social security numbers to the fund managers. 
There is no cost of collecting the individual savings in this system since 
all the money is provided by  the government. The biggest potential cost 
of individually organized accounts is thereby eliminated. 
A potentially useful option is to have a government-managed fund as 
a “default option,” for anyone who does not choose a private company 
or prefers a government fund manager. I say potentially useful option be- 
cause, while such a manager could act as a low-cost standard that disci- 
plines private providers, there is a danger that the government would sub- 
sidize this fund manager so that it comes to be so attractive that it has 
most of the money, the very problem that individually organized accounts 
are designed to avoid. 
How Expensive Would Privately Organized Accounts Be? 
I return now to Peter Diamond’s assertion that privately organized ac- 
counts would cost about one hundred basis points, equivalent to $100 per 
account per year at the present time. As I look at the evidence, I think 
that that estimate is much too high for the following reasons. 
The TSP Benchmark. The TSP run by  the federal government now costs 
$20 per worker per year. That includes (1) collecting funds from each indi- 
vidual in a system that allows individuals to select different percentages 
of their salary to be  contributed and (2) managing a loan program that 
uses TSP as collateral. Many of the extra costs that Diamond associates 
with going from TSP to general government-organized accounts (thereby 
increasing the cost from $20 to $40-$50)  would be avoided or offset by 
centralized collection and crediting of  deposits as part of  the ordinary 
social security payroll operations in the way that I described above. The 
government-organized accounts would be no more costly than the TSP, 
that is, about $20 per account per year or about twenty basis points for 
the average-size account. 
Private Mutual Fund Benchmark. Major mutual fund managers offer eq- 
uity index funds at about thirty basis points and fixed income funds at 
an even lower cost. These mutual funds have to collect funds and make 
payments, a major expense that would  be avoided by  the centralized fi- 
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Foreign Experience, Diamond and others cite the high costs in Chile, Mex- 
ico, and the United Kingdom. I believe that that experience is irrelevant 
given the very efficient and low-cost system demonstrated by U.S.  mutual 
fund providers. 
Selling  Costs, Markups, and Managed Funds. Mutual funds now provide 
indexed investments at thirty  basis points  despite their  advertising ex- 
penses. Some individuals would prefer managed funds to index funds de- 
spite their higher charges. Perhaps such managed funds would cost one 
hundred basis points, adding about $50 a year or $1 per week to the cost 
of the account. Diamond does not like that idea, considering it wasteful 
and frivolous, despite the fact that a large fraction of current mutual fund 
investors have shown a preference for such funds. More generally, Dia- 
mond does not like the prospect of individuals having a large number of 
choices, noting that the current phone-service market with its “dizzying 
array of options” is a good parallel to the problem that would face individ- 
uals with privately organized accounts. Does that mean that the govern- 
ment should not allow competition among phone companies with mul- 
tiple options? And what about automobiles or household detergents? It 
would be ironic if  the government prevents people from spending $1 a 
week extra to get managed funds rather than indexed funds while encour- 
aging those same individuals to buy state lottery tickets. 
Technical Progress  and Innovation.  The next  decade will  see enormous 
changes in communications technology, making the ability to access infor- 
mation over phone lines virtually free. The technology that will  soon be 
widely available will make it possible to use phones (as well as personal 
computers) to review investments and make changes among the options 
offered by fund managers. 
All  this will reduce the cost of individual accounts. It is wrong to as- 
sume, as Diamond does, that administrative costs will rise in the future in 
proportion  to wages (and therefore to account deposits). It is  far more 
likely that this technological service will  see the kinds of cost-reducing 
gains that will cause its relative cost to decline significantly. 
I am convinced, moreover, that competition among private fund manag- 
ers is much more likely to achieve faster technical progress and more inno- 
vative and user-friendly service for individuals than would occur with a 
government monopoly. 
References 
Aaron, Henry, and Robert Reischauer. 1998. Countdown to reform: The great social 
Advisory Council on Social Security. 1997. Report of the 1994-96 Advisory Council 
security debate. New York: Century Foundation Press. 
on Social Security. Washington, D.C. Administrative Costs and Equilibrium Charges  169 
Diamond, Peter. 1997. Macroeconomic aspects of social security reform. Brook- 
ings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 2: 1-89. 
Feldstein, Martin.  1997. Don’t waste the budget surplus.  Wall Street Journal, 4 
November, A22. 
Feldstein, Martin, and Andrew Samwick. 1998. Potential effects of two percent 
personal retirement accounts. Tax Notes 79, no. 5 (4 May): 615-20. 
Poterba, James.  1997. The rate of return to corporate capital and factor shares. 
Working Paper no. 6263. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Re- 
search. 
Discussion Summary 
Peter Diamond began with two additional points on costs and a rebuttal 
to Martin Feldstein’s comments on his paper. Diamond first noted that 
the possibility for individuals to open and hold multiple social security 
individual accounts could be a significant driver of costs and that a mecha- 
nism should exist to limit individuals to one account. Second, he noted 
that  many  individuals currently  incur  the  (out-of-pocket)  cost  of  em- 
ploying personal investment advisers and that there is no inherent reason 
to believe that this would not continue under a system of individual ac- 
counts.  In response to Feldstein’s comments, Diamond  first took  issue 
with Feldstein’s comparison of the rate of return to the current social secu- 
rity system to the rate of return to a system of individual accounts, arguing 
that it is not legitimate to compare the “return” on funds in a pay-as-you- 
go system to a portfolio rate of return. Second, Diamond questioned the 
legitimacy of  Feldstein’s claim that political considerations make govern- 
ment management and investment of funds infeasible. Diamond argued 
that it is just as likely that large corporations would be able to exert enough 
influence on Congress to stave off the type of government meddling that 
Feldstein suggested may occur. Third, he clarified his characterization of 
the costs of private management of individual accounts as “prohibitive” 
as meaning that private management would be higher cost without  any 
significant offsetting benefit. And, finally, he noted that his comparison of 
a privately managed system of individual accounts to the current, frag- 
mented phone-service provider market  was intended to suggest simply 
that the market will be complex and that we  should focus not just on the 
low-cost provider but also on the mean and distribution of the level of 
costs across the system as it is likely to be quite heterogeneous. 
Sylvester Schieber began the discussion by questioning Diamond’s con- 
tention that no current reform plan is proposing a 10 percent benefit cut 
(which is the amount by  which individual account accumulations would 
be decreased by having them privately managed as opposed to government 
managed, according to Diamond’s paper). Schieber noted that the Kerrey- 
Moynihan plan required benefit cuts of at least 10 percent and that Kerrey 170  Peter Diamond 
had been clear in stating this. Diamond  acknowledged that this was a 
fair point. 
Estelle James suggested that Diamond’s estimate of an annual commu- 
nications cost of $40-$50  per person seemed too high. She noted that the 
comparable figure for the Thrift Savings Plan is roughly $20 per person 
and that much of  that comes from supporting its loan activity, which 
would not be an issue for social security individual accounts. She also 
noted that mutual fund transfer agents charge only roughly $25 per head 
and that they offer a relatively high level of service. Diamond countered 
that neither of these systems deals with as large and heterogeneous a pop- 
ulation as the one with which the managers of social security individual 
accounts would be dealing. James agreed that the different population 
would  imply different costs, especially with  respect to accommodating 
multiple languages, but she emphasized the point that Diamond’s conclu- 
sions are sensitive to the $40-$50  figure and that, if true communications 
costs are actually $20-$25,  the effective reduction in account accumula- 
tions would be much lower. 
Leonard Glynn inquired into the incremental benefit to the social secu- 
rity system of investing a portion of the social security funds in the capital 
markets. Specifically, he asked whether the tax increases and/or benefit 
cuts needed to save the current system would be lower if  social security 
funds were invested in capital markets. Peter Diamond noted that there are 
two separate elements to this question. First, it is true that, if, in fact, the 
Social Security Trust Fund can accrue more money over time through 
investment in the capital markets, the tax hikes and/or benefit cuts needed 
to meet future obligations would be lower. The second issue is  the risk 
associated with the change in portfolio and on whom this risk would fall. 
Alan Gustman suggested that it may be possible to get some empirical 
evidence on demand for an individual account option and likely admin- 
istrative costs by  “red-circling’’ a certain group of current workers to be 
eligible to opt out of social security and invest in individual accounts. 
Diamond disagreed, noting that a large part of the cost dynamics and cost- 
saving potential of management of individual accounts comes from uni- 
formity. If an institution had to perform special functions to service the 
experimental group, it would not shed much light on the likely cost issues 
in a completely new institutional framework. 
Responding to Gustman’s point,  Olivia Mitchell noted that many pri- 
vate pensions  do effectively red-line certain groups of  people-for  ex- 
ample, individuals below a certain age and/or job tenure do not have to 
participate-and  there may be some useful evidence there on demand for 
pension  instruments.  Mitchell  also  voiced  disagreement  with  Martin 
Feldstein’s contention that foreign countries’ experience with moving to 
individual accounts is irrelevant to the American experience. She argued 
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system of individual accounts. Feldstein responded that he meant that the 
foreign experience was irrelevant to our ascertaining the cost of  imple- 
menting such a system in the United States. John Shoven suggested that 
foreign costs ought to be an upper bound on the costs. But Peter Diamond 
disagreed, asserting that, while it may  be  an upper  bound on costs, it 
would not necessarily provide an upper bound  on equilibrium pricing, 
which would depend on demand elasticities and other factors. Finally, 
Mitchell left as an open issue the comment that, if we  believe that adminis- 
trative costs of individual accounts are too high, perhaps we  ought to be 
considering individual accounts  that  are based  on larger contributions 
than just 2 percent of payroll. 
Responding to Peter Diamond’s earlier comment on social security’s 
unfounded liability, Sylvester Schieber suggested that perhaps we  should 
view this as a sunk cost and pursue the goal of reforming the system to be 
efficient in the steady state separately from the issue of how this sunk cost 
will be paid off. He suggested that combining the issues could result in our 
rejecting a reform that would be optimal in the steady state because it 
entailed a transition cost that fell disproportionately on one group. Peter 
Diamond agreed that the sunk cost is a separate issue and commented that 
his quarrel was with the attempt directly to compare the returns in a status 
quo system to the  returns  to a system  of  individual accounts.  Martin 
Feldstein countered that, even if one drops the direct comparison, it is still 
the case that, if the market earns 7.5 percent (8.5 percent with a 1 percent 
reduction for administrative costs), that is  inherently attractive. And, if 
the only way  to access that return is to replace some of the pay-as-you- 
go element with an individual account element, then there is an efective 
comparison in favor of the individual accounts, if not a direct one. 
Michael Graetz argued that the central issue in private as opposed to 
government management of individual accounts is the overriding political 
risk  inherent  in  government-managed  accounts.  He  asserted  that,  al- 
though in theory the government-management option would unquestion- 
ably imply lower administrative costs, it could produce prohibitively high 
costs from politically motivated investment strategies. He also suggested 
that any analysis of the attractiveness of individual accounts should take 
into account the possibility of  early withdrawal of funds, which would 
decrease accruals. Finally, Graetz emphasized the importance of including 
a low-cost default option in any individual account system. The alterna- 
tive to offering such an option, he argued, will be considerable price and 
product regulation of the funds that are offered. This Page Intentionally Left Blank